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Abstract: Internet of Things (IoT) is a new paradigm that has been evolving into the wireless
sensor networks to expand the scope of networked devices (or things). This evolution drives
communication engineers to design secure and reliable communication at a low cost for many
network applications such as radio frequency identification (RFID). In the RFID system, servers,
readers, and tags communicate wirelessly. Therefore, mutual authentication is necessary to ensure
secure communication. Normally, a central server supports the authentication of readers and tags by
distributing and managing the credentials. Recent lightweight RFID authentication protocols have
been proposed to satisfy the security features of RFID networks. Using a serverless RFID system is
an alternative solution to using a central server. In this model, both the reader and the tag perform
mutual authentication without the need for the central server. However, many security challenges
arise from implementing lightweight authentication protocols in serverless RFID systems. We propose
a new secure serverless RFID authentication protocol based on the famous elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC). The protocol also maintains the confidentiality and privacy of the messages, tag information,
and location. Although most of the current serverless protocols assume secure channels in the setup
phase, we assume an insecure environment during the setup phase between the servers, readers, and
tags. We ensure that the credentials can be renewed by any checkpoint server in the mobile RFID
network. Thus, we implement ECC in the setup phase (renewal phase), to transmit and store the
communication credentials of the server to multiple readers so that the tags can perform the mutual
authentication successfully while far from the server. The proposed protocol is compared with other
serverless frameworks proposed in the literature in terms of computation cost and attacks resistance.
Keywords: RFID; serverless; mutual authentication; IoT; ECC
1. Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a technology that allows us to detect items through
electromagnetic waves. Many existing industries improve their daily business operations and
annual profits by using RFID systems and applications. It involves product allocation, supply chain
management, inventory tracking, toll collections, access control, and more. Furthermore, RFID
technology has been expanding significantly to become essential for daily life matters and integrated
with household, automotive, and smartphone applications.
A simple RFID system consists of three main components: tags, readers, and servers [1]. The RFID
tag is a small chip that works as a transponder to a query signal. It is usually attached to an item to
be detected among many other tagged items in the same network. The tag is composed of a small
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antenna that is attached to a microchip and a small memory to store the identity and secret credentials
of the object.
On the other hand, a reader is a receiver that works as a scanner to collect data from the
tag. It is placed in either a fixed or mobile location to interrogate the tags in the surrounding
field. The server is a data processing unit that stores, controls, and manages the data used during
the communication between the reader and the tag. An RFID system is depicted in Figure 1 [2].
Because the communication channel between the reader and the tag is assumed to be insecure while
messages are transmitted, the information would be vulnerable to security attacks such as replay
attack, impersonation, traceability, man-in-the-middle, desynchronization, denial of service, cloning,
and disclosure attack. A secure RFID system must be able to resist different types of attacks through
maintaining system requirements of mutual authentication, confidentiality, integrity, availability,
privacy, and forward and backward secrecy.
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Identifying products and humans and authenticating their validity is a crucial daily matter,
especially in mobile RFID systems, where the readers and tags exist in locations far from the central
server. In situations such as the cars dealership industry, a large number of vehicles needs to be
identified and located off the dealership facilities and during transfer between locations. Identifying
an asset starts by authenticating the real asset among many other assets. This is done using a secure
authentication between the tag and the reader to identify the vehicle and register the location of the
legitimate car. Tracking vehicles could use the owners’ information to manage the transportation and
avoid unwanted incidents such as car theft or location lost. Authorized facilities must control access to
the cars’ information, by allowing only authorized users to access the data. Individuals’ privacy is
essential, so any adversary should not be able to obtain any valuable information about the vehicles
from the attached tags. Privacy can be achieved by confusing the adversary by sending noise signals
from different locations to avoid capturing the data and prevent tracing back the transmitted signals
using network traffic analysis.
The continual development of the RFID system led to the introduction of the concept of serverless
RFID, where the communication between the RFID reader and tag does not involve a central server.
This becomes a necessity if the objects are mobile and destined from the server. This innovative scheme
raised significant security issues in the RFID system because both the reader and tag should form
an autonomous communication venue. That means authentication and encryption needs to be done
by the tags as well as the readers, which is intensive computing. Multiple serverless RFID protocols
have been proposed using lightweight operations, such as pseudo-random number generator and
exclusive-OR operations [3]. Even though these protocols meet the requirements of the RFID passive
tags limited resources, they are still exposed to security breach due to the lightweight operations used
primarily in the reader and tag for authentication.
Many of the currently proposed RFID authentication protocols assume a secure environment
during the setup phase between the server, the reader, and the tags, which is not realistic in most of the
cases. In our work, we provide a security mechanism to the setup phase. The setup phase updates
the protocol parameters to perform asset authentication. The process misleads the adversary about
the location of the asset. The proposed Serverless RFID Authentication Protocol Based on Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (SLEC) gives the reader the ability to handle signals that are sent from a group
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of tags at the time, and helps to mislead the adversary from tracing the real tags. We also secure the
tag information using keys shared between the reader and tag. ECC public-key algorithm is used
and compared with other ECC protocols to validate the proposed model. A few analysis models are
developed to prove the novelty of the proposed work. In Section 2, we discuss related work that we
found in the literature. In Sections 3 and 4, we discuss the system model and SLEC protocol details.
In Sections 5 and 6, we present the security analysis and formal verification test. We conclude our
work in Section 7.
2. Related Work
In this section, we present some of the previous work on the RFID authentication protocol that
is particularly based on the mutual authentication between the reader and the tag to establish a
secure communication in the RFID network. The low-cost passive RFID tag is small chip designed
with limited resources that are only able to perform low computations. Consequently, a literature
review was conducted by Baashirah et al. [1] to classify the RFID authentication protocols based on
the algorithm complexity that the tag has to perform for its responses. This classification includes:
heavy-weight, simple-weight, light-weight, and ultra-lightweight. According to Baashirah et al.,
the heavy-weight protocols use heavy computation algorithms, such as public key and symmetric
key cryptography. Their computation overhead is beyond the ability of the RFID passive tags to
process. The simple-weight protocols use a simple operation such as the hash function that generates
a significant computation overhead on the tag due to the limited tag resources. The light-weight
protocols use operation with low computation overhead as oneway hash function, cyclic redundancy
check (CRC), and pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). Lastly, the ultra-lightweight protocols
use operations with considerably low computation overhead, such as simple bitwise operations that
can be performed at a minimal cost possible for the tag.
2.1. Heavyweight Protocols
Wang and Sarma [4] proposed two session-based authentication protocols, SB-A and SB-B, for
the reader–tag authentication based on symmetric key encryption. Their protocols are based on a
symmetric cryptography algorithm to provide low-cost authentication using two types of passive tags
to ensure privacy and access control. However, symmetric cryptography algorithms such as Data
Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are expensive operations that
require a lot of computational overhead on the tag.
Considering highlevel security, the elliptic curve cryptography is introduced as one of the
public-key schemes for low constraint devices. Using the same concept of public and private keys
for both the reader and the tag, the RFID system is able to defend most of its security threats. Ryu et
al. [5] proposed elliptic curve cryptography-based untraceable authentication protocol (ECU) using the
Schnorr signature scheme to overcome the traceability problem. ECU protocol is proposed to overcome
the issues of three recent untraceable authentication protocols based on elliptic curve algorithms:
strong privacy-preserving authentication protocol (SPA) [6], efficient mutual authentication protocol
(EMA) [7], and ECC-based authentication protocol PII [8]. Ryu’s protocol generates a digital signature
with an appendix on the binary message of arbitrary length and requires a cryptographic hash function.
The sender’s session key is combined with the receiver’s public key to provide privacy, in which the
message can be verified by only the receiver’s private key. Ryu’s protocol is secure against replay
attacks, impersonate attacks, traceability attacks, and it maintains forward security. However, ECU
requires two scalar multiplications, two hash functions, a message total size of 544 bits, and two
communications between tag and reader, which creates a heavy computation overhead on the tag.
Even though this protocol requires complex computations associated with scalar multiplications and a
hash function, it does not authenticate the reader.
To reduce the tag’s overhead in heavyweight protocols, Yao et al. [9] introduced the
reviving-under-dos (RUND) authentication protocol to defend against denial of service (DoS) and
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preserve user privacy by powering up the tag to do complex computing for symmetric and public-key
cryptography. The more signals there are in communication, the more power charges the tag.
Even though the overall efficiency of RUND is O(1), it is still not compliant with the Electronic Product
Code Class1 Generation2 (EPC C1 G2) standard [10], which is defined by EPCGlobal Inc. for RFID
data communication.
2.2. Simple-Weight Protocols
To better improve the performance of RFID protocols and reduce the power that is needed for
complex operations in ECC-based protocols, Farash [11] proposed a mutual authentication protocol
(IECC) based on the elliptic curve to overcome the vulnerabilities in Chou’s authentication protocol
(EMA) [7]. The computation cost of IECC still needs to be reduced for practical implementation.
Zhang and Qi [12] also proposed another ECC based authentication protocol (EECC) to withstand
the security weaknesses of Chou’s protocol, EMA [7]. In comparison to EMA protocol, EECC protocol
resulted in better performance and security resistance to impersonate and forward security attacks.
However, Baashirah et al. [13] found that Zhang and Qi’s protocol is vulnerable to forward traceability
and reader impersonate attack, as an adversary can compromise the private key of the reader by
obtaining the tag’s secret identifier.
Baashirah et al. improved Zhang and Qi’s (EECC) protocol and proposed Hash-Based
Authentication Protocol using Elliptic Curve protocol (HBEC) protocol that is based on securing
the tag’s secret identifier using a oneway hash function. The HBEC protocol overcomes the security
flaws in EECC protocol to provide high security, even though the extra hash function adds more
overhead to the computation, which should be addressed for the network scalability.
B.Chen [14] proposed a role-based access control (RBAC) protocol for mobile RFID, to enable
user privacy, role, and access control through the back-end server based on a certification mechanism.
RBAC assigns role classes as keys to control the information and the number of times each reader
can read a tag. The protocol is effective against traceability, replay attack, unauthorized access, and
integrity. However, RBAC uses one encryption mechanism that is excessive for low-cost passive tags.
2.3. Lightweight Protocols
Successful businesses require a secure RFID system that is able to perform efficiently, using low
computation overhead at the minimal cost possible. The prominent RFID protocols employ low-cost
operations that are handled by the inexpensive passive tags for practical applications. Accordingly, an
efficient authentication protocol (SEAS) was proposed by Dass and Om [15], which uses lightweight
operations and a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) for low computations on the tag.
An alternative solution to replace the central database in the RFID system is to use a serverless
model in which the database server does not maintain a connection with the readers and tags during the
communication. Regarding this challenge, Mtita et al. [16] proposed (SAP), a serverless security protocol
used for the mass authentication of RFID tags in the presence of untrusted readers. The protocol has
been proven using the CryptoVerif tool [17], which was shown to have low computation overhead
and resources.
To reduce the communication time during the authentication session, K. Lee et al. [18] proposed
the efficient passively-untraceable authentication protocol (EP-UAP) based on randomized hash-lock
protocol. The system precomputes all of the necessary computations before the system initialization
in EP-UAP, so only low computation overhead is required on the tag side during the process phase.
Because precomputing the random responses requires a storage memory in the database, EP-UAP is
preferred for small to medium networks, as the storage memory increases when the number of tags
increases. The protocol shows considerable improvement over the randomized hash-lock protocol in
terms of computation time. However, it requires 100 MB of database storage memory in the database,
and it cannot defend active attacks such as impersonate and replay attacks since the random responses
depend on the database/reader.
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2.4. Ultra-Lightweight Protocols
As mentioned earlier in this paper, passive tags are small chips with scarce resources that can
only support low-cost operations. The goal of ultra-lightweight protocols is to reduce the cost of RFID
systems to a minimum, and provide strong security for promising future use. In this regard, Sundaresan
et al. [3] introduced an ultra-lightweight serverless protocol (STS) using only simple XOR and 128-bit
PRNG operations that require less than 2000 gates to conform to EPC C1 G2 Standard. In STS protocol,
the tag can preserve its location privacy by responding as a noise tag, and the pseudo-random numbers
that are used in communication between readers and tags are made hidden using a blind factor to
overcome impersonation attacks.
Aggarwal and Das [19] proposed the CWH+ protocol, which is based on a previous version
introduced by Y. Chen, Wang, and Hwang (CWH) [20]. The CWH+ protocol solves the problem of
full disclosure attack due to the simple XOR operation that is used in the authentication message,
which uses the bit rotation and shifting operation on the message before transmission to increase the
protocol complexity. CWH+ protocol is resistant to replay attack, forge attack, and DoS with a very
efficient computation.
Huang and Li [21] proposed and implemented two improved protocols of RFID based on
generating the PadGen function in the ISO 18000-6C [22] protocol to protect the memory with a 32-bit
access password (Apwd) before transmitting the data. They used PadGen with XOR in one protocol
(PGX) and PadGen with Modulo operation (PGM) in the other one. Even though both schemes conform
to the EPC C1 G2 standard, the security level of the PGM scheme is higher because of the low-cost
implementation, but the computation cost in PGX is lower.
Based on the related work and its implications, it is noted that the heavyweight and simple-weight
protocols are not feasible for practical implementation. On the other hand, lightweight and
ultra-lightweight protocols use only simple operations within the tag computation limits and show the
lowest tag computation overhead level, so they are most used in the current applications. Many RFID
protocols are proposed to defend against different attacks. However, several vulnerabilities are detected
in the lightweight protocols because it is easy to break out the security of their simple operations.
3. System Model
In the event of a mobile RFID system, a reader and a tag start communicating by authenticating
each other without a central database to perform the necessary calculations to establish a secure
communication channel. In the authentication session, the reader and tag transmit challenging
messages that can only be computed and verified by a legitimate entity. The transmitted messages
should be confidential; they require encryption and decryption using low-cost operations within
the ability of the passive tag to process. The privacy of the tag is also required to protect the tag
secret information and location from being exposed to adversaries. Because the secure algorithms
require extensive computations, it is important to minimize the communication signals in the network
especially when the number of tags is high. We developed a secure and appropriate authentication
algorithm that maintains the security of the system and privacy of the tags, while minimizing the
communication signals in the network to reduce the computation overhead on both the reader and the
tag. In this section, we present the system model and the communication model of the proposed work.
3.1. Network Model
A number of RFID passive tags are distributed in an area of interest and attached to mobile
objects. All the tags have the same resources and computational capabilities. The passive tag has no
power source and gets activated based on the electromagnetic waves that are sent from the reader at
the beginning of the communication. The RFID reader is a scanning device that is either in a fixed
position or mobile handheld. It has more resources and computational capability than the passive tag.
It collects the tag information such as the electronic product code (EPC) [10], which is a 96-bit string
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of data that contains the tag identity, organization, protocol, product type, and owner. The reader
reports the scanned information to the database server. The server is a centralized database device
with a computer program that delivers, stores, and manages all the information of the readers and
tags. The reader interrogates the tag in the range by sending a challenging request signal to start the
communication. The tag responds to the reader’s request based on the approved protocol to verify
its legitimate identity. The reader forwards the tag’s response to the server to search for the correct
information of the tag in the database. The server supports the reader to authenticate the tag to start a
secure channel between the reader and the tag for their further communication. Additionally, the tag
uses the approved protocol to verify the reader’s identity to avoid compromising the secret information
or location of the tag.
3.2. Serverless Model
The server role is eliminated in the proposed serverless model of RFID. The backend server is not
available during the communication between the reader and the tag. The reader and tag should be able
to verify each other and process the authentication messages successfully while the server is oﬄine.
Because the passive tag is considered a low constraint device with scarce resources, the transmitted
message between the reader and the tag should carry simple operations within the capability of the
tag to perform. Therefore, we consider the elliptic curve cryptography that can be operated by the
passive tag to exchange the secret keys. We employed the elliptic curve key agreement based on the
discrete log problem in the Diffie–Hellman algorithm [23], which allows the reader and the tag to
establish a shared key from their own public and private keys through an insecure channel to encrypt
the transmitted messages. The elliptic curve is a plane curve over a finite field that contains points
satisfying the following equation:
y2 = x3 + ax+ b (1)
The protocol uses the multiplicative group of integers modulo P, and G as a primitive root modulo
P, where P is prime. The reader and the tag choose random integers a and b, respectively, as their
private keys and compute their public keys as the following:
A = Ga mod P (2)
B = Gb mod P (3)
The values of A and B are exchanged between the reader and the tag. Then, the reader computes
the shared secret s using the received B and P as the following:
s = Ba mod P (4)
The tag also computes the shared secret s using the received A, and G, P as the following:
s = Ab mod P (5)
As a result, both the reader and the tag end up calculating the same value as their shared secret
keys because the modulo rules satisfy the following:
Ab mod P = Gab mod P = Gba mod P = Ba mod P (6)
which also means:
(Ga mod P)b mod P = (Gb mod P)
a
mod P (7)
Based on the points P and G, the resulted shared secret can take any value between 1 and P-1 that
satisfies the following condition: 1 ≤ s ≤ P− 1. The security of the elliptic curve algorithm lies in the
complexity of computing the original values of public and private keys to obtain the secret key.
Electronics 2019, 8, 1166 7 of 24
4. Proposed Protocol
The communication between the system entities in SLEC protocol has three phases; setup phase,
authentication phase, and an optional recovery phase. The recovery phase is needed to renew the
values in the reader and tag from a new server. Table 1 denotes the protocol notations.
Table 1. Protocol Notations.
Symbol Definition
P Point generator of G
G An additive group of prime order q on an elliptic curve
yprv, rprv, tprv Private keys of server, reader, tag
Ypub, Rpub, Tpub Public keys of server, reader, tag
Xi Tag identifier
Tagi tag ID, group ID, Timestamp
Gk Group ID
Listk List of tags share the same group ID
4.1. Setup Phase
This phase handles transferring the necessary data and values from the server to the reader and the
tag. The server, the reader, and the tag share by the manufacturer: the elliptic curve point generator and
the server public key. The tag by default stores its own random identifier that is updated every session
to protect the real identity of the tag. The setup phase is also considered a renewal phase, such that the
reader and the tag request new values to start a new communication session. The renewal phase is
necessary when the timestamp expires, or any secret value is compromised to an unauthorized party.
Unlike the currently available RFID protocols, the setup phase environment in SLEC protocol is
assumed to be insecure and functions as the following steps:
1. The reader and the tag generate random numbers rprv1, tprv1, respectively, where r, t Zq, then
compute their public key using the private keys and the point generator as:
Rpub1 = rprv1 ∗P (8)
Tpub1 = tprv1 ∗P (9)
2. The tag and the reader compute the server secret message of M1, M2, respectively, using their
private keys tprv1, rprv1 and the stored public key of the server Y as the following:
M1 = rprv1 ∗ Y (10)
M2 = tprv1 ∗ Y (11)
3. The reader and tag send the computed server shared secret M1, M2 to the server, then the server
obtains the public keys of both reader and tag as:
R′pub1 = y−1 ∗M1 (12)
t′pub1 = y−1 ∗M2 (13)
4. The server, in turn, computes the shared secret M1, and M2 for each reader and tag using the
server private key yprv for further communication with the reader R and the tag T as the following:
M′1 = yprv ∗R == rprv1 ∗ Y = M1 (14)
M′2 = yprv ∗ T == tprv1 ∗ Y = M2 (15)
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5. The server generates and stores the following information for each tag:
• Random Xi as a tag identifier
• Group ID Gk
• Timestamp Ts
such that Tagi = {Xi, Gk, Ts}
6. The server then generates a list of tags for each reader, which contains a group of tags that
share the same group ID. The group ID will have multiple advantages in our proposed system.
It provides security against tracing a specific tag when the reader receives multiple signals from
different tags. It also reduces the communication signals in the network and the number of
transmitted messages. Further, it reduces the computation overhead on the reader side when
only the tags sharing the same group ID respond to the reader’s request.
7. Further, the server sends the reader the tag list as M3, and sends the tag data to the tag as M4.
M3 = Listk + h
(
R′pub1, M′1
)
(16)
M4 = Tagi + h
(
T′pub1, M′2
)
(17)
8. The reader computes and verifies the hash value to obtain the list of tags. The tag also verifies the
hash value to obtain the tag information. The server current public key is not shared during the
communication, so only the legitimate reader and tag that have the real server public key will be
able to compute and verify the hash value to obtain the messages sent by the server.
4.2. Authentication Phase
When the setup phase is completed successfully, each reader will have a list of tags that have: a
tag ID, group ID, timestamp for each tag, and the tag will have: a tag ID, group ID, and timestamp.
The communication starts with mutual authentication between the reader and the tag, as demonstrated
in the following steps:
1. The reader generates a random number rprv2, where r  Zq, then computes its public key using
the private keys and the point generator as:
Rpub2 = rprv2 ∗P (18)
2. The reader computes the M1 and M2 and sends them to the tag
M1 = h
(
Gkj
)
(19)
M2 = Rpub2
⊕
Ts (20)
3. The tag processes five steps:
• Validates M1 = h
(
Gk j
)
using the current or old value of Gk to verify the intended group.
Based on the group verification, the tag generates a random number tprv2, where t  Zq and
computes its own public key
Tpub2 = tprv2 ∗P (21)
• Obtains the reader public key from M2
Rpub2 = (M2
⊕
Ts) − Y (22)
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• Computes the secret share key with the reader using the reader obtained public key
M3 = tprv2 ∗Rpub2 (23)
• Computes the authentication message M4 and sends it to the reader
M4 = h
(
Xi,Rpub2 , Tpub2 , Gkj
)
(24)
• Update the values of the tag ID, Gkj-1, and Gkj
Xi = PRNG(Xi) (25)
Gkjold = Gkj (26)
Gkj = PRNG
(
Gkj
)
(27)
4. The reader extracts T′pub2 from the received message and verifies the hash value of M4 to
authenticate the tag
T′pub2 = r−1prv2 ∗M3 (28)
5. The reader updates the values of the tag ID, Gkj, then computes M5 and sends it to the tag
M5 = h
(
Xi, Rpub2 , Tpub2
)
(29)
Xi = PRNG(Xi) (Equation (25))
Gkj = PRNG
(
Gkj
)
(Equation (27))
6. The tag verifies M5 to authenticate the reader.
4.3. Recovery Phase
In an event where any value of the communication is compromised, the tag or the reader is
able to renew the communication values from any server checkpoint during the transportation route.
The recovery phase is similar to the secure setup phase presented earlier. The tag and reader will
exchange their newly generated public keys using the server’s public key stored in their memory.
This will allow the reader and tag to be retrieved back into the network with new values.
In our SLEC protocol, we created an RFID network with a dynamic size so that the number of
readers and tags can be increased or decreased. We included one server, five readers, and twenty
tags that are placed in objects such as cars. The distance range between the tags and readers is
initially assumed to be a few meters based on the reading range of electronic product code class1
generation 2 of RFID passive tags [10]. The server initializes a database table to store all the readers’
and tags’ unique IDs. The readers are placed in fixed positions such as poles along the route of the
mobile tags. Before the car departs the dealership inventory, the setup phase is executed, and all the
values are stored in the tag and readers. During the tag movement, the reader can scan the tag to
perform the mutual authentication and thus, obtain the required information of the tag. The protocol is
implemented using Python programming language. The protocol process is presented in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 SLEC (executed by server, reader, and tag in SLEC protocol)
1: Setup Phase:
2: Input parameters:
3: minimum value for server_public_key (Y)
4: point generator (P)
5: tag random identifier (Xi) in server
6: Reader:
7: for each reader do
8: Select random rprv1 Zq
9: Rpub1 = rprv1 ∗ P
10: M1 = rprv1 ∗Y
11: for each tag in TagList do
12: Select random tprv1 Zq
13: Tpub1 = tprv1 ∗ P
14: M2 = tprv1 ∗Y
15: send M2 to reader
16: end for
17: forward M1 , M2 to server
18: end for
19: Server:
20: extract Rpub1 , Tpub1 from M1 , M2
21: R′pub1 = y−1 ∗M1
22: T′pub1 = y−1 ∗M2
23: generate Tagi : [Xi, Ts, Gk j]
24: create TagListk : [Tagi, .., Tagn]
25: M3 = TagListi + h(R′pub1, M1)
26: M4 = Tagi + h(T′pub1, M2)
27: send M3 to reader
28: send M4 to tag
29: Reader:
30: verify the hash value and extract TagListi = M3 − h(R′pub1, M1)
31: Tag:
32: verify the hash value and extract Tagi = M4 − h(T′pub1, M2)
33: Authentication Phase:
34: Server is oﬄine
35: Reader:
36: for each reader do
37: select random rprv2 Zq
38: Rpub2 = rprv2 ∗ P
39: M1 = h
(
Gk j
)
40: M2 = Rpub2
⊕
Ts
41: send M1 , M2 to tag
42: end for
43: Tag:
44: for each tag do
45: validate M1 to verify the group
46: if M1 == True do
47: select random tprv2 Zq
48: Tpub2 = tprv2 ∗ P
49: extract Rpub2 = M2
⊕
Ts
50: M3 = tprv2 ∗Rpub2
51: M4 = h
(
Xi, Rpub2 , Tpub2 , Gk j
)
52: update:
53: Xi = PRNG(Xi)
54: Gk−1j = Gk j
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55: Gk j = PRNG
(
Gk j
)
56: Send M3 ,M4 to reader←
57: end if
58: end for
59: Reader:
60: for each tag in TagList do
61: extract T′pub2 = r−1prv2 ∗M3
62: validate M4 to authenticate tag
63: if M′4 == M4 do
64: Tag is authenticated
65: M5 = h
(
Xi, Rpub2 , T′pub2
)
66: update:
67: Xi = PRNG(Xi)
68: Gk j = PRNG
(
Gk j
)
69: send M5 to tag
70: end if
71: end for
72: Tag:
73: validate M5 to authenticate reader
74: if M′5 == M5
75: reader is authenticated
76: end if
5. Security Analysis
In this section, we present the system performance and security analysis of SLEC. We also
compare the SLEC to other serverless protocols. The security of SLEC mainly depends on the public
key of the central server, which is securely disseminated to all readers and tags. Further, the setup
and authentication phases can then be executed in insecure networks while maintaining system
requirements and defending security threats.
5.1. Analysis of System Requirements
The SLEC protocol maintains the system requirements that are necessary to create a secure and
reliable RFID system, such as mutual authentication, confidentiality, integrity, privacy, forward secrecy,
anonymity, and availability.
5.1.1. Mutual Authentication
The protocol allows both the reader and the tag to perform a mutual authentication, since only
the legitimate tag can extract the public key of the reader from the message M2. Furthermore, only the
legitimate reader can calculate the hash value in the message M5 to prove its identity to the tag. As a
result, mutual authentication is satisfied.
5.1.2. Privacy and Confidentiality
The transmitted message is confidential because the authentication messages are secured by a
hash value, which can only be computed by authorized entities using their secret keys. The privacy of
the tag is satisfied as the secret information is protected and not transmitted in clear.
5.1.3. Message Integrity
The message integrity factor is also satisfied because the messages are combined with a digital
signature of the sender.
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5.1.4. Forward and Backward Secrecy
The tag and reader generate new secret values in every authentication session to avoid tracking
the previous or forward session or obtaining any valuable data. Thus, an adversary cannot
perform a successful authentication from any past or expired sessions or anticipate the following
authentication messages.
5.1.5. Anonymity
The EPC of the tag is not used in the protocol, but only the tag random identifier is used, which is
updated every session. As a result, the private information stored in the tag is kept secret.
5.1.6. Availability
The protocol provides a recovery mechanism to maintain system availability. In an event where
any tag or any secret value of the communication is compromised, the system can recover the tag by
sending new values to the tag during the recovery phase to perform a new authentication session as
long as the public key of the server remains secret. Otherwise, a new setup phase is required to feed
the tag with a new public key for the server.
5.1.7. Scalability
We introducedd the concept of tag grouping in SLEC. We combined a number of tags into one
group that shares the same group ID with all the tags, but different tag IDs. This mechanism allows
the system to reduce the communication signals that are transmitted in the network, since only the
tags with the same group ID will respond to the reader request. Moreover, the grouping mechanism
reduces the computation overhead on the reader side when identifying a tag from a large number of
tags. As a result, the protocol is scalable by maintaining a consistent operation overhead on both the
reader and the tag sides.
Table 2 demonstrates the comparison of the system requirements that are satisfied in SLEC, the
SAP protocol proposed by Mtita et al. [16], and the STS protocol proposed by Sundaresan et al. [3].
Table 2. Comparison of System Requirements.
System Requirement SAP STS SLEC
Mutual Authentication Y Y Y
Privacy and Confidentiality N Y Y
Message Integrity Y Y Y
Forward and Backward Secrecy N N Y
Anonymity * Y Y
Availability N N Y
Scalability N N Y
Y: satisfied; N: not satisfied; *: Not applicable.
5.2. Analysis of Security Requirements
The protocol is based on the Diffie–Hellman digital signature algorithm using a 256-bit key, which
is equivalent to the RSA algorithm with a 3072-bit key that is longer than the commonly used key of
2048 [24]. This gives a higher level of security to the SLEC algorithm. Therefore, the protocol is secure
against different security attacks that most of the RFID protocols can experience.
5.2.1. Replay Attack
The proposed SLEC is secure against replay attack, as the authentication session involves
timestamps and freshly generated random values as private keys for both reader and tag. If an
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adversary eavesdrops on the communication channel to replay the tag response, he will not be able to
extract any message from the reader or the tag, and the timestamp will not match the current session.
Lemma 1. SLEC is secure against replay attack.
Proof. Adversary replays old session1 to the reader:
M3 = tprv1 × (rprv1 × P)
M4 = h
(
X1 +
(
rprv1 × P
)
+
(
tprv1 × P
)
+ Gk1
)
Reader verifies in session2:
T′pub2 = r−1prv2 × [tprv1 × (rprv1 × P)]
M′4 = h(X2 +
(
rprv2 × P
)
+ [r−1prv2 × tprv1 × (rprv1 × P)] +Gk2)
Verification fails since M′4 , M4. Unauthorized tag is not authenticated. 
5.2.2. Man-In-The-Middle Attack
If an adversary interrupts the message transmitted by a reader or a tag to modify it and send it
back as a real message, the message will not be extracted by any entity and the communication will be
terminated if no response is sent because all the messages transmitted in the authentication session
involve validating the values before extracting any data from them. Therefore, the SLEC protocol is
resistant to Man-In-The-Middle attack.
Lemma 2. SLEC is secure against modification.
Proof. Adversary A intercept message 3 and 4 and modifies the tag information by A:
M3 = aprv1 × (rprv1 × P)
M4 = h
(
Xa +
(
rprv1 × P
)
+
(
aprv1 × P
)
+ Gka
)
Reader verifies in session2:
A′pub1 = r−1prv1 × [aprv1 × (rprv1 × P)]
M′4 = h(X1 +
(
rprv1 × P
)
+ [r−1prv1 × tprv1 × (rprv1 × P)] +Gk1)
Verification fails since M′4 , M4. The tag id and group key used in the message sent by A are not
the same in the reader list for the requested tag. Unauthorized tag is not authenticated. 
5.2.3. Traceability Attack
An adversary can trace the signals sent by a specific tag to identify the tag location. However,
the reader in the SLEC protocol broadcasts the message signals to a group of tags that respond to
the reader for the same message request. This will result in sending different signals from different
locations to confuse the adversary from tracking a specific tag to obtain its location. Accordingly, the
protocol is resistant to tracing.
Lemma 3. SLEC is secure against tracing.
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Proof. To distinguish the difference between two tags T1 and T2, an adversary has to construct
the correct hash value with correct tag id (X), timestamp (Ts), and group key (Gk), which are only
transmitted during the setup phase:
M4 = Tagi + h
[(
tprv1 × P
)
+
(
tprv1 × (y× P)
)]
Tagi = M4 − h
[(
tprv1 × P
)
+
(
tprv1 × (y× P)
)]
The adversary has to solve the correct elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) to obtain
the secret values in Tagi that are used in the communication. 
5.2.4. Impersonate Attack
It is unlikely for any adversary to impersonate the reader or the tag in our protocol since they
used a shared point generator algorithm (P) that is only known to the legitimate server, reader, and tag.
Therefore, the adversary cannot compute the required messages to pass the authentication.
Lemma 4. SLEC is secure against impersonation.
Proof. Reader: M1 = h(Gk)
M2 = (rprv × P)
⊕
Ts
Adversary: aprv, Apub = aprv × P
M3a = aprv × (raprv × P)
M4a = h
(
Xa +
(
raprv × P
)
+ Apub + Gka
)
Reader: A′pub = r−1prv ×
[
aprv × raprv × P
)
]
M4 = h
(
X + R′pub +Apub +Gk
)
Validation fails since M4 , M4a. Unauthorized tag is not authenticated. 
5.2.5. Desynchronization Attack
The tag in SLEC stores the new and previous values of the group identifier that is used at the
beginning of the authentication phase. This allows the tag to authenticate the reader if the previous
session was interrupted by an adversary to break the synchronization. The communication values are
also updated after every successful authentication session using the same algorithm and inputs, to
maintain the synchronization state between the network entities.
5.2.6. Denial of Service Attack
In SLEC, the tag and reader generate their keys separately using the same key generation algorithm,
so there is no synchronous update of the keys between the server and the tag for the attack to occur.
Table 3 demonstrates the comparison of the security attacks resistance between our SLEC protocol,
the SAP protocol proposed by Mtita et al. [16], and the STS protocol proposed by Sundaresan et al. [3].
Electronics 2019, 8, 1166 15 of 24
Table 3. Comparison of Security Resistance.
Attacks SAP STS SLEC
Replay Attack Y Y Y
Man-in-the-Middle * * Y
Eavesdropping Y * Y
Impersonate Attack Y Y Y
Traceability Attack Y Y Y
Desynchronization * Y Y
Denial of Service * Y Y
Y: Satisfied; N: Not satisfied; *: Not applicable.
5.3. Analysis of Computation Cost
Because the passive tag used in the RFID system has limited capabilities and resources, it is crucial
to consider the computation and security features for the appropriate application. Even though the
elliptic curve has higher computation overhead on both the reader and the tag, we provide a higher
security level in our SLEC protocol that satisfies the resistance to all the security attacks. Moreover,
we compare our protocol with additional server-based elliptic curve protocols, such as the IECC
protocol proposed by Farash [11] and the EECC protocol proposed by Zhang and Qi [12] to illustrate
a well-defined measurement for the computation complexity. The comparison shows that there is
no significant additional cost between the previously proposed ECC-based protocols and our SLEC
protocol, although SLEC is completely serverless in the authentication phase. Table 4 demonstrates the
operations computed by the tag and the number of transmitted messages from the reader and the tag
during the authentication phase.
Table 4. Comparison of computation cost.
Protocol Operation Tag Reader
SAP [16] 2TH + 2TRNG 1 2
STS [3] 7TXOR + 3TPRNG 1 1
IECC [11] 2TSMUL + 2TH 1 2
EECC [12] 2TSMUL + TSAD + 2TH 1 2
SLEC 2TSMUL + 3TH 1 2
TSMUL: scalar multiplication; TSAD: scalar addition; TH: oneway hash; TXOR: XOR; and TPRNG: pseudo-random
number generation.
5.4. Analysis of Communication Cost
In this section, we analyze the communication cost of the proposed protocol and compare it with
other ECC-based protocols to show the improvement of the communication cost using ECC.
We use a standard 163-bit NIST elliptic curve using 5 MHz tags. We will emphasize the elliptic
curve operations in our comparison. The running time of scalar multiplication in ECC is 64 ms. In our
proposed protocol, we require two scalar multiplications that are executed in 64 × 2 = 128 ms. We use
an elliptic curve defined over a finite field of F(2163). We assume the length of the elliptic curve
element is 163 bits, the elliptic curve point is 42 bytes, and the output of the hash function is 20 bytes.
The comparison results of the performance are depicted in Table 5. According to the performance
results, the proposed protocol shows slightly better performance and communication cost that is more
suitable for real implementation.
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Table 5. Comparison of communication cost.
Protocol From Tag From Reader Total
IECC [11] 124 62 186
EECC [12] 124 41 165
SLEC 62 86 148
Point = 42 bytes, Element = 21 bytes, Hash output = 20 bytes, ID = 4 bytes, Timestamp = 4 bytes.
6. Formal Verification
We have conducted a formal verification for SLEC to prove the correctness of the algorithms
used. ProVerif [25] is a powerful tool used to analyze the security of cryptographic protocols. It is an
automatic cryptographic protocol verifier that is developed by Bruno Blanchet to validate the security
and authentication properties of the cryptographic algorithms in formal models.
In this section, we use the ProVerif tool to validate reachability and secrecy (security) and
correspondence assertion (authentication) of SLEC protocol. The results of the verification process are
also presented.
6.1. Adversary Model
The ProVerif verification is based on a model where the adversary can intercept, alter, and inject
the messages into an insecure network. In SLEC, the adversary has initial knowledge of the finite set
of parameters that increase during the protocol execution in parallel with the adversary. No matter
how the adversary interacts with the protocol, ProVerif verifies the secrecy of the messages and values
transmitted between the server, the reader, and the tag. Therefore, the secret messages will never
be a part of the adversary knowledge to run the protocol successfully. The results of the ProVerif
verification in this section show that the protocol preserves the secrecy of the messages and values.
6.2. Reachability and Secrecy
ProfVerif Reachability and Secrecy analyzes the security properties of the protocol against multiple
types of attacks. We investigate the reachability of a term x by an adversary A, so we assess the secrecy
of x with respect to the modeled protocol. In SLEC, we use ProVerif to test whether the secret messages
in the setup phase “Ms”, and the secret messages in the authentication phase “Ma” are not available
to an adversary A. We represent the messages transmitted in the setup phase from the server, the
reader, and the tag as “Mss”, “Msr”, and “Mst”, respectively. Moreover, we represent the messages
transmitted in the authentication phase from the reader and the tag as “Mar” and “Mat”, respectively.
The complete verification process is demonstrated in Figure A1 in Appendix A. The results of the
verification process conclude, “RESULT not attacker(Mst1[]) is true”, which means the setup phase
message M1 from the tag is unreachable, and an attack cannot be conducted against the protocol
successfully. Similarly, “RESULT not attacker(Mar1[]) is true” means the authentication phase message
M1 from the reader is unreachable and secure against the attacks. All setup phase and authentication
phase messages were tested and resulted in true reachability and secrecy proof.
6.3. Correspondence Assertion
The correspondence assertion in ProVerif is to model the authentication of the protocol using
a sequence of events. We apply a sequence of events to verify the authentication of the reader to
the tag and the authentication of the tag to the reader through the encrypted messages individually.
The complete verification process of the authentication is presented in Figure A2 in Appendix A.
The results of the correspondence assertion verification show “RESULT inj-event(termReader(x))
==> inj-event(acceptsReader(x)) is true”, which means the reader is authenticated by the tag, and
“RESULT inj-event(termTag(x_24)) ==> inj-event(acceptsTag(x_24)) is true”, which means the tag is
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authenticated by the reader. The verification results confirm that SLEC protocol achieves a successful
mutual authentication between the reader and the tag.
7. Conclusions
RFID is the new alternative to physical barcodes, which is widely being used for products inventory
and asset tracking. Serverless RFID protocols are being developed to provide a dynamic network, so
that mobile tags (attached to items) can be searched and identified in different locations away from the
server. Numerous research considers the issue of system security and data privacy in the reader–tag
mutual authentication. As an RFID network carries along sensitive information, and passive tags have
limited resources, many security protocols have been implemented at a minimal computational cost
using simple operations. However, this does not make it secure against cyberattacks. We propose a
secure serverless RFID protocol (SLEC) that uses ECC, which is based on the Diffie–Hellman encryption
algorithm. ECC is classified as a public-key encryption algorithm that low constraint devices, such
as RFID passive tags, can handle efficiently. We have proved that SLEC is secure against all attacks.
The reader in SLEC protocol is completely capable of identifying and authenticating mobile tags
without the need for a server. We also introduced the tag grouping mechanism to reduce the reader’s
computation overhead due to ECC computation, while identifying a tag in a large-scale network.
Tag grouping provides a scalable system that is not affected by the tag population size. Furthermore,
SLEC protocol has a recovery mechanism to renew compromised values by any server in the network.
The protocol was tested using ProVerif, which is a cryptographic verification tool. ProfVerif proved
that SLEC achieves secure authentication. As for future work, we will work on implementing a testbed
for the protocol using industrial passive tags and readers.
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    {55}let Rprv1': pu_pr_key = setPhase_decrypt(Msr1',getYinv(y_22)) in 
    {56}new ts: timeStampes; 
    {57}let tagi: Tag = create_tag(xi,ts,Gxi) in 
    {58}let tagListi: TageList = create_taglist(tagi) in 
    {59}let Mss3_30: TagList_and_Hash = 
prepare_tagList(tagListi,h(Rprv1',Msr1')) in 
    {60}out(ch, Mss3_30); 
    {61}let Mss4_31: Tag_and_Hash = prepare_tag(tagi,h(Tprv1',Mst1')) in 
    {62}out(ch, Mss4_31) 
) 
-- Query not attacker(Mst1[]) 
Completing... 
Starting query not attacker(Mst1[]) 
RESULT not attacker(Mst1[]) is true. 
-- Query not attacker(Msr2[]) 
Completing... 
Starting query not attacker(Msr2[]) 
RESULT not attacker(Msr2[]) is true. 
-- Query not attacker(Mss3[]) 
Completing... 
 Figure A2. Cont.
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